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NOTES AND COMMENTS
EFFECT OF DRILLING REGULATIONS UPON
THE LAW OF CAPTURE3 HE rapid development of the petroleum industry in the United
States has required a corresponding development in legal con-
cepts of property to be applied to operations in this field.' During
the early days of the industry the courts, most of which conceded
that landowners had some sort of property rights in minerals be-
neath the surface of their land, were faced generally with the fol-
lowing three possible theories of ownership which could be ap-
plied:' (1) Owners of the surface above a reservoir could be
treated as tenants in common of the reservoir. (2) The common
law concept of ownership of real property' could be applied so
that each surface owner would be held to have title to the oil and
gas in place beneath his tract and retain ownership of it regard-
less of its migration elsewhere. (3) Each owner of surface above
a reservoir could be accorded a property interest in the reservoir
in the nature of a privilege to produce all the oil and gas which
he was able to reduce to possession by operations on his tract;4 this
has been called the "law of capture" or "rule of capture." All
other theories of ownership of oil and gas in the reservoir are
combinations or variations of these three.
The application of a theory of co-ownership of the reservoir
presented insurmountable difficulties to the courts fifty years ago
due to the lack of knowledge of the nature and properties of the
reservoirs in which oil and gas were discovered and the technical
' Apparently the first case in the United States which involved property rights in
oil was Hail v. Reed. 54 Ky. 383 (1854).
2 Masterson, The Legal Position of the Drilling Contractor, First Annual Institute
on Oil and Gas Law, Southwestern Legal Foundation (1949) 183, 207.
3 Early legal writers confidently stated that ownership of land carried with it com-
plete dominion upwards to the heavens and downwards to the center of the earth.
Development of aircraft as well as the development of the petroleum industry has
required some revision of thought on this point. See Hinman v. United Airlines Trans-
port Corp., 84 F. 2d 755 (1936), cert. denied, 300 U. S. 654 (1937).
4 Of course, this rule never extended to oil or gas recovered by operations not en-
tirely on the land of the producer. Liability for drainage which results from bottoming
a well on the land of another is well established. See Aphonzo E. Bell Corporation v.
Bell View Oil Syndicate, 24 Cal. App. 2d 587, 76 P. 2d 167 (1938); Gliptis v. Fifteen
Oil Co., 204 La. 896. 16 So. 2d 471 (1943).
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problems inherent in a determination of the extent of the reservoirs
and their exact location. It was impossible to treat surface owners
as tenants in common of the pool if it could not be decided under
whose lands it lay. The theory of ownership in place also presented
great difficulties because of the fugacious nature of the subject
matter. Once migration has begun, the original location of oil or
gas cannot be determined. Oil produced from the wells on one
tract may have come from another tract a considerable distance
away-there are no characteristics by which oil or gas originating
under a particular surface area can be identified.' However, Texas
and some other states adopted the theory of ownership in place and
have continued to follow it in name.' In practice the theory has
been limited by the necessity of the contemporaneous application
of the law of capture.
7
The law of capture has been applied by the courts in two differ-
ent forms. The first is that discussed above, a theory of ownership
of an interest in an oil and gas reservoir-a privilege to produce
oil and gas accorded to owners of the surface, limited only by the
requirement that production be within their own boundaries. The
second form which the law of capture has taken is that of a rule
of property which merely settles the question of title to oil and gas
which has been reduced to possession without regard to the rights
or liabilities which may arise as a result of the production. In other
words, although the law of capture is followed by name in all
states,8 some of the courts interpret it as meaning to a producer
of oil and gas, "You can take all that you can get by operations
on your own land," while the other courts reach the result, "You
5 Hardwicke, The Rule of Capture and Its Implications as Applied to Oil and Gas,
13 Tex. L. Rev. 391 (1935).
6 Apparently the primary justification for the ownership in place or absolute own-
ership theory is its practicality in application to transfers of interests in the minerals
before severance. Treatment of the oil and gas in a reservoir as a part of the land above
it has simplified this field of law and prevented courts from falling into some of the
inconsistencies of reasoning found in the opinions of courts in the qualified ownership
and non-ownership states.
7 Walker, Property Rights in Oil and Gas and Their Effect Upon Police Regula-
tion of Production, 16 Tex. L. Rev. 370 (1938).
8 Hardwicke, supra note 5, at 391 et seq.
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own all the oil and gas you produce, but if your methods of pro-
duction are illegal or unreasonable, you may be liable to adjacent
landowners who are injured." In fact, the increasing recognition
by the courts of correlative rights and duties of operators in a
common reservoir has so pruned the law of capture as a theory
of ownership of a privilege to produce that it is often difficult to
distinguish the result in many situations from that which would
have been reached had a theory of co-ownership been applied and
each of the producers required to account to the others for any
production which exceeded his fair share.
This modification of the law of capture has occurred through
the recognition by many of our courts that the results reached by
a strict application of the rule are, at times, contrary to estab-
lished rules of justice and equity and detrimental to the public
well-being.9 Development of scientific skills in the petroleum in-
dustry has made it possible to determine with reasonable accuracy
the exact location of discovered reservoirs and the amount of oil
and gas contained therein. The courts have begun to recognize that
it is now possible to ascertain whether or not production from one
tract is resulting in drainage from under another and that the deter-
mination of the amount of drainage so caused is not an insoluble
problem.1" As the ability to solve the problems relating to physical
properties of the reservoirs has developed, the application of tra-
ditional concepts of property ownership developed by the courts
in the early cases are no longer necessary." It is not improbable
that continued encroachments, by court decisions, upon the law of
capture will soon limit its application to the determination of title
to oil and gas reduced to possession.
The development of limitations on the law of capture is exempli-
9 Kelley v. Ohio Oil Co., 57 Ohio St. 317, 49 N. E. 399, 39 L. R. A. 765 (1897),;
Hague v. Wheeler, 157 Pa. 324, 27 At. 714, 22 L. R. A. 141 (1893).
10 Patterson v. Stanolind Oil & Gas Co., 182 Okla. 155, 77 P. 2d 83 (1938) ; Brown
v. Humble Oil & Refining Co., 126 Tex. 296, 83 S. W. 2d 935, 87 S. W. 2d 1069, 99
A. L. R. 1107, 101 A. L. R. 1393 (1935) ; Elliff v. Texon Drilling Co., 146 Tex. 575,
210 S. W. 2d 558, 4 A. L. R. 2d 191 (1948).
11 1 SUMMERS, THE LAW OF OIL AND GAS (1938 ed.) § 63.
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fled by the recent Texas case of Loeffler v. King 2 A simplified
statement of the problem arising in this case, insofar as it pertains
to the law of capture, is as follows: Plaintiff owned a mineral in-
terest in an 80-acre tract which was part of a larger tract of ap-
proximately 143 acres. Plaintiff executed an oil and gas lease to
A covering the 80-acre tract. The lease expired for lack of produc-
tion. A also obtained a lease on the remainder of the larger tract.
Acting in ignorance of the expiration of the lease on plaintiff's
tract, he entered into an agreement with B assigning the north one-
half of the large tract to B. A and B drilled wells on the tract and
complied with the well-spacing regulations" with reference to the
division line between the north and south halves of the tract. Since
plaintiff's 80-acre tract extended into the south half of the larger
tract, wells drilled by A, which were 330 feet from the division
line of the half assigned to B, although not on plaintiff's tract, were
within less than the required 330 feet of the south boundary there-
of. These wells produced oil in paying quantities, and plaintiff
brought suit for a declaration that A's lease on his tract had ex-
pired and for damages resulting from unlawful drainage of the 80-
acre tract due to the violation of Rule 37. The court of civil ap-
peals held that plaintiff had a cause of action for wrongful drain-
age of his tract. No decision as to the measure of damages was
rendered.14 The court based its decision upon the premise that the
law of capture is limited in its application to legitimate operation
of a producer. Since Rule 37 has for its objective the protection
of land from unreasonable drainage by adjacent wells, it is a re-
straint upon the unlimited right of capture, for breach of which
there is a right of action by adjacent mineral owners whose inter-
est in the common reservoir is jeopardized thereby.'
12 228 S. W. 2d 201 (Tex. Civ. App. 1950).
Is Rule 37 of the Railroad Commission of Texas.
14 This case is, at present, on appeal to the Supreme Court of Texas. Due to the
complicated nature of the case and the many problems, other than the one under dis-
cussion, which are involved, the supreme court may dispose of the case without pass-
ing on the question of liability for wrongful drainage based on a violation of Rule 37.
15 228 S. W. 2d at 210-215.
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Loeffler v. King is the first case in Texas in which a cause of
action for wrongful drainage based upon violation of well-spacing
regulations has been recognized."6 The courts have been slow in
recognizing any right of action for wrongful drainage. Many of the
early cases refused to allow any recovery even where injury by
drainage was apparent. In Hague v. Wheeler 7 the court refused
to enjoin waste of natural gas from a common reservoir and, in
referring to the rights of a surface owner in the gas, said,
"He cannot prevent its movement, away from him, towards an outlet
on some other person's land, which may be more or less rapid, depend-
ing on the dip of the rock or the coarseness of the sand composing it;
but so long as he can reach it, and bring it to the surface it is his abso-
lutely, to sell, to use, to give away, or to squander, as in the case of his
other property."
The absolute right to take oil and gas under the law of capture
was recognized to the extent that cases refused recovery for ex-
cessive drainage due to artificial means of production,8 location of
wells close to plaintiff's boundary lines, 9 or negligently allowing
a well to blow out with resulting depletion of the reservoir." How-
ever, this application of an unlimited right of capture seems to
have been repugnant to some courts from the beginning, and the
cases upholding the existence of correlative rights and duties
among owners of interests in a common reservoir have become
more frequent, until today, according to Mr. Summers, "clear rec-
ognition is given to the rights of landowners against drainage of
16 Only one other case was found in which recovery was permitted for wrongful
drainage due to drilling too close to a boundary line. In Ross v. Damm, 278 Mich.
388, 270 N. W. 722 (1936), recovery was predicated upon proof that the location of
defendant's wells was such that they drained substantially all of the oil from plaintiff's
land while, at the same time, rendering it impossible for plaintiff to obtain a drilling
permit to offset the wells and prevent such drainage.
17 157 Pa. 324, 27 Atl. 714, 720, 22 L. R. A. 141 (1893).
11 Higgins Oil and Fuel Co. v. Guaranty Oil Co., 145 La. 233, 82 So. 206, 5 A. L. R.
411 (1919) ; Jones v. Forest Oil Co., 194 Pa. St. 379, 44 Atl. 1074, 48 L. R. A. 748
(1900).
19 Kelley v. Ohio Oil Co., 57 Ohio St. 217, 49 N. E. 399, 39 L. R. A. 765 (1897);
Barnard v. Monongahela Natural Gas Co., 216 Pa. 362, 65 At. 801 (1907).
20 McCoy v. Arkansas Natural Gas Co., 175 La. 487, 143 So. 383, 85 A. L. R. 1147
(1932), cert denied, 287 U. S. 661 (1932) ; Louisiana Gas & Fuel Co. v. White Bros.,
157 La. 728, 103 So. 23 (1925).
19501
SOUTHWESTERN LAW JOURNAL
oil and gas, and privileges or opportunities to produce their equi-
table shares."21
In the case of Manufacturer's Gas and Oil Co. v. Indiana Nat-
ural Gas and Oil Co.2" plaintiff sought an injunction against an-
other operator who was taking gas from a common reservoir by
means of artificial pumping devices. The court, in deciding that
plaintiff had a right to such an injunction, said,
"Natural gas in the ground is so far the subject of property rights in
the owners of the superincumbent lands, that while each of them has the
right to bore or mine for it on his own land, and to use such portion of
it as, when left to the natural laws of flowage, may rise in the wells of
such owner and into his pipes, no one of the owners of such lands has
the right, without the consent of all the other owners, to induce an un-
natural flow into or through his own wells, or to do any act with refer-
ence to the common reservoir, and the body of gas therein, injurious to,
or calculated to destroy it .... So, in the case of natural gas, the manner
of taking must be reasonable .... ,, 2
Landowners over a common reservoir have a right that the oil
and gas therein shall not be wasted or destroyed." There is a right
of action against the owner of a well which is abandoned without
having been properly plugged. 25 An operator is liable for damage
to the common reservoir which results from negligent use of nitro-
glycerine in shooting a well26 or from negligent drilling which
causes his well to blow out.2 A landowner may secure an injunc-
tion against the sinking of wells on adjoining tracts without proper
permits,"8 or he may secure damages where wells drilled contrary
21 Summers, Legal Rights Against Drainage of Oil and Gas, 18 Tex. L. Rev. 27, 38
(1939).
22 155 Ind. 461, 57 N. E. 912, 50 L. R. A. 768 (1900) ; see also Peterson v. Grayce
Oil Co., 37 S. W. 2d 367 (Tex. Civ. App. 1931), affd, 128 Tex. 550, 98 S. W. 2d 781
(1936).
23 57 N. E. at 915.
24 Louisville Gas Co. v. Kentucky Heating Co., 117 Ky. 71, 77 S. W. 368, 70 L. R. A.
558 (1903).
25 Atkinson v. Virginia Oil and Gas Co., 72 W. Va. 707, 79 S. E. 647, 48 L. R. A.
(N. S.) 167 (1913).
26 Comanche Duke Oil Co. v. Texas & Pacific Coal & Oil Co., 298 S. W. 554 (Tex.
Comm. App. 1927).
27 Elliff v. Texon Drilling Co., 146 Tex. 575, 210 S. W. 2d 558, 4 A. L. R. 2d 191
(1948) ; see comments in 62 Harv. L. Rev. 146 (1948); 20 Miss. L. J. 96 (1948) ; 27
Tex. L. Rev. 349 (1949).
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to spacing regulations have drained his tract.2 19 In general each
owner of a right to produce minerals from a reservoir has a right
that production by other owners shall not jeopardize his opportu-
nity to obtain his fair share of the oil or gas which was in place
in the reservoir in its natural state. s
The extent to which this right to a fair share of the minerals is
protected by the courts is still not completely settled. Although the
results in Elliff v. Texon Drilling Co."' indicate that, in Texas, neg-
ligent injury to the reservoir is sufficient basis for recovery of dam-
ages for drainage resulting therefrom, there is little authority sup-
porting this proposition in other states.8 2 Where recovery is sought
upon the basis of bieach of a duty imposed upon an operator by
statute or by a rule or regulation imposed under statutory author-
ity, it seems clear that there should be no question of the right of
recovery for wrongful drainage. That there is' statutory authority
in Texas for such recovery seems clear from the following lan-
guage:
"Nothing herein contained or authorized, and no suit by or against
the [Railroad] Commission, and no penalties imposed upon or claimed
against any party violating any Statute of this State, or any rule, regu-
lation, or order of the Commission, shall impair or abridge or delay
any cause of action for damages, or other relief, any owner of any land
or any producer of crude petroleum oil or natural gas, or any other
party at interest may have or assert against any party violating any rule
or regulation or order of the Commission, or any judgment herein
28Magnolia Petroleum Co. v. Railroad Commission, 90 S. W. 2d 659 (Tex. Civ. App.
1936), modified, 128 Tex. 189, 96 S. W. 2d 273 (1936) ; Stanolind Oil and Gas Co. v.
Railroad Commission, 92 S. W. 2d 1057 (Tex. Civ. App. 1936) ; Empire Gas and Fuel
Co. v. Railroad Commission, 94 S. W. 2d 1240 (Tex. Civ. App. 1936).
29 Loeffler v. King, 228 S. W. 2d 201 (Tex. Civ. App. 1950).
5o "This reasonable opportunity to produce his fair share of the oil and gas is
the landowner's common-law right under our theory of absolute ownership of the min-
erals in place. But from the very nature of this theory, the right of each land holder
is qualified and is limited to legitimate operations." Elliff v. Texon Drilling Co., 146
Tex. 575, 210 S. W. 2d 558, 562 (1948).
31 Id.
52 But see the statement of the Louisiana court in McCoy v. Arkansas Natural Gas
Co., 175 La. 487, 143 So. 383, 384 (1932), indicating that recovery might have been




mentioned. Any party owning any interest in any property or produc-
tion which may be damaged by any other party violating this act or
any other Statute of this State prohibiting waste or violating any valid
rule, regulation or order of the Commission, may sue for and recover
such damages, and have such other relief as he may be entitled to in
law or in equity."8
This statute is cited as authority for the recovery authorized in
Loeffler v. King. It seems that even in the absence of any express
authority to sue for damages caused by breach of a statutory duty,
such a right to sue would exist where the statute violated has as its
purpose not only the protection of the public as a whole by con-
servation of natural resources but also the protection of individual
owners of interests in oil and gas reservoirs from actions by others
which deprive them of an opportunity to produce their fair share
of the minerals.84
Statutes in most oil and gas producing states have imposed spe-
cific duties on producers which are clearly contrary to the theory
of the law of capture as an unrestricted privilege to produce. In
general, these statutes have been upheld as a valid exercise of the
states' police power. 5 The duties imposed may be divided into the
following classes: (1) prevention of underground and surface
waste by requirements that abandoned wells be plugged, proper
casing be used in wells, certain wasteful means of production not
be used, certain gas-oil ratios be maintained, prohibition of waste-
ful burning of gas, requirement of repressuring of formations, and
restrictions upon the open flow of gas wells; (2) location and spac-
ing regulations; and (3) proration of production. 6
There seems to be no valid reason for failure to recognize that a
cause of action would exist where any of these duties imposed
8 TEx. REV. CIv. STAT. (Vernon, 1948) art. 6049 c, sec. 13.
84 Elliff v. Texon Drilling Co., 146 Tex. 575, 210 S. W. 2d 558 (1948).
"5 Ohio Oil Co. v. State of Indiana, 177 U. S. 190 (1900) ; Patterson v. Stanolind
Oil & Gas Co., 182 Okla. 155, 77 P. 2d 83 (1938), app. dism'd, 305 U. S. 376 (1939) ;
Oxford Oil Co. v. Atlantic Oil & Producing Co., 22 F. 2d 597 (C. C. A. 5th, 1927), cert.
denied, 277 U. S. 585 (1928).
86 1 SUMMERS, THE LAW OF OIL AND GAS (1938 ed.) c. 5; see TEX. REV. Civ. STAT.
(Vernon, 1948) tit. 102 for examples of such statutes.
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by statute is violated. Wrongful drainage of a neighbor's tract
through violation of proration regulations seems no more tortious
than drainage due to violation of a spacing rule. 7 If the courts
follow LoeffIler v. King and extend the rights of landowners to re-
covery for any violation of rules, regulations or statutes, it is sub-
mitted that the rule of capture will exist only as a rule of property
in determining title to oil and gas reduced to possession and that
privileges to produce will be essentially the same under the extant
law as if the courts were applying a theory of co-ownership of the
reservoir by owners of the surface.
Since modern scientific techniques have made possible the deter-
mination of the location and potential production of a reservoir
with reasonable accuracy, it does not seem that treatment of owners
of the superincumbent lands as tenants in common of the reservoir
would be the source of problems substantially more difficult than
those which arise from tenancies in common of the surface. The
alienability of interests in the minerals would not be adversely af-
fected. The interest would be an interest in land and subject to
recordation statutes and the Statute of Frauds. Oil and gas fields
might be developed more economically by obviating the necessity
of drilling a well on each small tract to protect the interests of its
owner. In short, the recognition of the theory of co-ownership by
the courts would have essentially the same effect as do the statutes
which have been adopted in a number of jurisdictions requiring the
forced pooling of mineral lands. The co-ownership theory is, there-
fore, subject to both the praises and the criticisms which apply to
forced pooling laws.
Insofar as the law of capture is considered merely a rule of
property in oil and gas which has been produced, it is not incon-
sistent with the theory of the cases allowing recovery for wrongful
drainage. The courts can hold that title to oil or gas vests in the
person producing it as soon as it is reduced to possession while, at
37 But see Ivey v. Phillips Petroleum Co., 36 F. Supp. 811 (S. D. Tex. 1941), deny-
ing recovery for drainage due to a violation of a proration order on the grounds that
there had been no orevious cases allowing such recovery.
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the same time, recognizing that the producer may be liable in dam-
ages to other owners of interests in the common reservoir due to
wrongful drainage of their tracts. This liability is not for wrongful
production but for wrongful drainage. Therefore, the law of cap-
ture, like the common law doctrines of accession and adjunction,
may pass title of property from an innocent person to a wrongdoer
under certain conditions but does not affect liability for the injury
actually done by the wrongdoer. There can be a loss of the right
to the return of property taken, without the loss of a right of action
for damages sustained by reason of the taking.
In formulating the rules to be applied in this comparatively
new field of law, tort liability for wrongful drainage, the courts
are faced with the problem of determining a measure of damages.
The law of capture, as qualified by the requirement of reasonable
and legal production, is more consistent with a measure of dam-
ages which would necessitate the reimbursement of the injured
party only for damages actually suffered and not for the value of
the oil wrongfully produced. Part of the oil or gas may have come
from the land of the wrongdoer and part from the land of the inno-
cent party. A reasonably accurate scientific determination of the
amount belonging to each, with all doubts resolved in favor of the
innocent party, could be made which would certainly serve as an
equitable basis for the adjustment of the rights and liabilities of
the parties. The law of capture would pass title to the whole of the
production to the wrongdoer, and his liability could be based either
upon the decrease in the value of the innocent party's land or upon
the market value of the oil or gas produced less credit for a pro-
portionate part of the drilling and operating expenses. 8 If the
courts should adopt the view that the wrongdoer is a converter of
the oil and gas drained and is, therefore, liable for its full value
at the mouth of the well or if the strict common-law doctrine of
confusion should be applied to divest the wrongdoer of any title
88 If a good-faith trespasser is entitled to reimbursement from production for drill-
ing and operating ejpenses, Swiss Oil Corporation v. Hupp, 253 Ky. 552, 69 S. W. 2d
1037 (1934), there is greater reason for allowing such reimbursement to a person
guilty only of wrongful drainage if he too acted in good faith.
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to the oil and gas produced by wrongful drainage, the result would
not only be inconsistent with the law of capture but would also
cause a very unjust result in cases such as Loeffler v. King, in which
the wrongdoer acted in good faith.89
A number of additional problems will arise in connection with
the increasing recognition of liability for wrongful drainage. Is
the owner of a royalty interest in a tract on which a well is produc-
ing by reason of wrongful drainage from another tract entitled to
royalty payments on this production? Does the owner of a royalty
interest in the drained tract have a right of action against the
wrongdoer, or does this right belong solely to the owners of min-
eral interests? What damage due to wrongful drainage will be
considered too remote to be the basis for a cause of action? The
answer to these and other questions should appear in the decisions
of courts during the next few years. Whether the effect upon the
oil and gas industry of the extension of tort liability to cases of
wrongful drainage will be detrimental or beneficial will depend
upon the ability of the courts and the legal profession as a whole
to formulate just and workable rules of law to meet the needs
which will arise in this new field.
Rufus S. Garrett, Jr.
89 But notice the theory applied by the Texas Supreme Court in Elliff v. Texon
Drilling Co., 146 Tex. 575, 210 S. W. 2d 558 (1948).
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